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In late 2014, the East India Company opened a new luxury tea and coffee store at 
the Royal Exchange in the City of London. Today’s East India Company does not, however, 
present itself as a tea shop named after the corporation whose officers Adam Smith charged 
with crafting a “perfectly destructive” system for the administration of Bengal during the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Instead, they claim as their own the Company’s “rich 
heritage” of “adventurous, honourable merchants” traversing the oceans “to discover the 
exotic and the elusive.” Contemporary corporations charged with historical malfeasance are 
all too keen to present traumas arising from their past acts as “legacy issues,” and disavow 
any genealogical intimacy. So why would today’s East India Company celebrate a heritage 
that cannot be disentangled from the administration of famine, war and imperial aggression? 
The answer perhaps is to be found in the saturation of contemporary British public culture by 
a jumbled imperial nostalgia. Oxford theologian Nigel Biggar has complained of a lack of 
pride in the ordering force of Britain’s empire and has set out to restore an ethics of empire 
by way of compensation. Meanwhile, his colleague Niall Ferguson has proudly proclaimed in 
response to a poll: “I won. Most [Brits] think the British Empire is more something to be 
proud of (59%) rather than ashamed of (19%).” 
These efforts to recast the British empire as beneficent underpin violent and 
exclusionary aspirations for the future. In Ferguson’s hands, the City of London’s place as 
the world’s great middleman is central to the rehabilitation of imperialism: not only did the 
Victorian imposition of “the rule of law” across its empire help mitigate investors’ contract 
enforcement concerns, but the only uncertainty that investors in the colonies had to face was 
“the expected duration of British rule.” With independence a remote prospect, colonial 
possessions appeared to receive more investment than other countries with similar 
“fundamentals.” If as Ferguson suggests “the appeal of investing in the empire is obvious,” 
how might that appeal be reflected in the contemporary financial imagination? I suggest here 
that the tools used by political risk analysts and insurers function as “technologies of the 
imagination” that provoke continued anxieties about the consequences of investing in 
sovereign, post-colonial nations. In the City of London, it is the discourse of political risk (or 
the risk that assets in post-colonial jurisdictions might be confiscated or devalued through 
regulatory actions that violate investors’ “legitimate expectations”) which serves as the point 
of exchange between the imaginative repertoires that condition financial practice, and those 
propelling broader attempts to revalorize Britain’s imperial past. 
Managing an empire of risk 
Financial agency is necessarily imaginative. The replacement of historical cost 
accounting with discounted cash flow models during the 1930s saw accountants and 
investors embrace the “risky business of tearing aside the veil which conceals the future.” 
Capital came to be allocated on the basis of projections, forecasts, and scenarios outlining 
what might come to pass. An “asset logic,” according to which things are valued on the basis 
of their capacity to produce revenue in the future, has become all-pervasive. This asset logic 
now makes itself felt with particular force in disputes between foreign investors and host 
states. The pages of international law journals are replete with attempts to standardize 
methods for calculating the compensation owed to foreign investors when their assets’ 
capacity to produce future income streams are threatened by nationalization - or, 
increasingly, by “creeping expropriation” or threats to an investor’s “legitimate 
expectations.”  In The Wretched of the Earth, Frantz Fanon observed that in the later stages 
of imperialism, what “the metropolitan financiers and industrialists expect is not the 
devastation of the colonial population but the protection of their ‘legitimate interests’ using 
economic agreements.” It is, then, not too surprising that the analysis and insurance of 
political risks - or threats to investors’ “legitimate” expectations and interests - emerged as a 
formal domain of managerial concern in response to the decolonization movements of the 
mid-twentieth century.  
One of the first comprehensive examinations of political risk, written by international 
business scholar Stephen Kobrin in the early 1980s, found that over half of the US-based 
transnational corporations surveyed had begun to institutionalize political risk management. 
Kobrin attributed a growing interest in political risk to the 1979 Iranian revolution, which had 
shaken the confidence with which American executives generated visions of the future. In 
addition to identifying the risk of new sovereigns intervening in their economies, Kobrin also 
drew on anthropologist Clifford Geertz’s New States project, noting the problems posed for 
the centralization of power (and guaranteeing of contracts) in nations divided by “primordial 
sentiments” and “tribal loyalties.” Political risk analysis has since become a “growth industry 
in its own right,” providing both quantitative and qualitative prompts for the imaginations of 
investors planning to enter new markets. But the categories used to produce these analyses 
are derived in turn from the market for political risk insurance that emerged in London in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s.  
The members of the insurance market at Lloyd’s of London, which once occupied the 
Royal Exchange and now stands a short walk away on the site of the original East India 
Company offices, have for centuries written policies that cover the “perils of the sea,” 
including the risks that war might pose to a ship’s hull or cargo. At the start of the First World 
War, one of the Lloyd’s underwriters provided cover - partly in jest - against the risk of a 
building being destroyed by aerial bombardment. While the business of insuring against war 
on land soon proved profitable, the previously unimaginable devastation wrought by aerial 
bombardment at Guernica in 1936 led to an agreement among the Lloyd’s insurers 
“excluding war risks on land.” Nearly half a century passed before a small group of brokers 
and underwriters in the City of London created a set of products to insure against a new kind 
of political risk on land. Specifically, the risks insured against were the Confiscation, 
Expropriation or Nationalization of assets located in independent, sovereign territories. 
Crucial to this innovation was the asset logic: risks posed to property by political unrest could 
not be ensured under the Guernica agreement, but the value of an investment could be. It is 
these insurable political risks that are now quantified, graphed, and analysed by dozens of 
risk analysis firms. The reports, graphs and numerical values produced by these firms in turn 
work as technologies of the imagination, provoking the decisions that executives and 
policymakers make about where to allocate their capital - and conditioning the requests that 
are made for guarantees and concessions when operating in a territory deemed “risky,” or 
potentially threatening to an asset-holder’s “legitimate” expectations. 
The (neo)colonial financial imaginary 
These technologies of the imagination do not, of course, work in a vacuum. They are 
nourished by a broader set of geographical and economic imaginaries that are intimately 
entwined with the imperial nostalgia that pervades Britain’s public sphere. Take, for example, 
this passage from a contribution to the Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law on 
“How investors react to political risk”: 
Among investors’ greatest fears may be the ascension to power of a figure like former 
Emperor Bokassa of the Central African Republic. He spent in excess of $20 
million, an amount representing a significant portion of his country’s foreign 
reserves, to give himself a grand coronation on a solid gold throne. He was 
deposed and later tried for cannibalism…Might another comparable person 
succeed in taking over another country? It may not be likely; however, investors 
may not feel comfortable concluding that it is too remote to warrant concern. 
Read alongside the assertion that political risk is negligible in developed markets or 
“Western liberal democracies,” it is clear that the geographical imagination provoked by 
numerical assessments of Confiscation, Expropriation or Nationalization risk also draw 
succour from a troubling “trope of the tripe,” reviving fevered images of blind loyalties, 
arcane rituals, cannibals and kings. As Kobrin’s borrowing from Geertz might suggest, 
political risk analysis has from its earliest days been concerned with how far unruly post-
colonial subjects might disrupt the earning potential of overseas assets.  
The fear that disorderly post-colonial sovereigns might Confiscate, Expropriate or 
Nationalize foreign-owned assets complements Ferguson’s claim that empire was good for 
the colonized (and for investors in the colonies) since the only uncertainty investors had to 
face concerned the expected duration of British rule. The continuity between the concerns of 
imperial investors and merchants, and contemporary political risk analysts, is manifest in the 
writings of Ian Bremmer, founder of one of the world’s largest political risk agencies. In The 
Fat Tail, Bremmer writes of the importance of managing political risks through political risk 
insurance as well as complex legal agreements and diplomacy: this is necessary since 
“gunboat diplomacy” is no longer acceptable. Presenting Lord Clive’s 1757 victory at Plassey 
as an “early corporate attempt at risk mitigation” Bremmer depicts Clive’s dealing with a 
“Bengali takeover” of East India Company possessions as comparable to Enron’s purchase 
of political risk insurance prior to entering into a 1993 agreement with the State of 
Maharashtra in 1993, an agreement which ultimately resulted in a “breach of contract.”  
Bremmer is perhaps more hard-nosed than the management of today’s revived East India 
Company when he identifies parallels between the “gunboat diplomacy” deployed by the 
East India Company of old, and the political risk insurance used today by cross-border 
investors. His interest is less in celebrating the “honourable” pursuit of exotic and elusive 
commodities, and more in providing the legal and financial means to shore up foreign 
investors’ “legitimate expectations” and ensure the honouring of contracts. But these 
expectations (that operating in a sovereign post-colonial territory should pose no threat of 
interruption to future income streams), and investors’ anxieties about disorderly post-colonial 
subjects that might violate those expectations, intersect with the imaginative repertoire 
deployed by the contemporary East India Company, Ferguson, Biggar, and other imperial 
nostalgists. In both cases, British imperialism is taken to have guaranteed stability, certainty, 
and the ready calculability of asset values; post-colonial sovereignty meanwhile introduces 
uncertainties and the potential for political action which threatens metropolitan investors’ 
legitimate expectations.  
Finance is a profoundly imaginative domain, in terms of the imaginative labour 
required to produce financial innovations, and the extent to which a financialized imagination 
limits the collective capacity to produce visions of the future outside of debt repayment 
schedules and personalized portfolio management. But the financial imagination is not 
hermetically sealed; it both draws upon and nourishes imaginaries with broader public 
purchase.  By examining the political risk analysis and insurance industry, it becomes clear 
that the images that foreign investors produce about the post-colonial territories in which 
they invest - images which impinge upon the calculation of an asset’s earning potential and 
so its value - share a great deal with the images circulated by imperial nostalgists hoping to 
rehabilitate the legacy of Britain’s empire. Cultivating alternatives to the financial imagination, 
or the imagination of the “asset logic,” must also involve resisting attempts to re-imagine 
empire and valorize the putative “stability” it is said to have provided, for the logic of empire 
and the logic of the asset are intimately entwined. 
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